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Abstract
We build a structural model that captures salient features of personal bankruptcy under
Chapter 13. We estimate our model using a novel data set we construct from bankruptcies
filed in Delaware between 2001 and 2002. Our estimation results highlight the importance
of debtor’s choice of repayment plan length on other Chapter 13 outcomes. We use the
estimated model to conduct policy experiments to evaluate the impact of more stringent laws
that impose restrictions on the length of repayment plans. We find that these provisions would
not materially a↵ect creditor recovery rates and would not necessarily make discharge more
likely.
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In short, the bankruptcy system operates behind a veil of darkness created by the lack of reliable
data about its operations. The lack of information about “what is going on” in the bankruptcy
system leads to a distrust of its results – a belief by some that creditors, debtors, and professionals
within the system are all somehow taking advantage of one another and the public at large, and
that the system su↵ers from widespread fraud, abuse, and ine ciency.
1997 National Bankruptcy Commission
1 Introduction
On April 20, 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA)
was signed into law and ended a comprehensive legislative e↵ort that began under the Clinton
administration. The new personal bankruptcy law imposed many new (and controversial) changes
including higher filing fees, “means test” on debtors contemplating a bankruptcy filing, and longer
length payment plan. The aim was to ensure that debtors with su cient income would file under
Chapter 13. The key presumption underlying this provision was that a large number of households
did not repay as much as their income allowed. In particular, it was thought that Chapter 13
would perform better, both as a collection device for creditors and as a means to provide debtors
with a financial fresh start, if stricter rules were imposed on repayment plans.
The objective of our paper is to take a first step at evaluating the impact of these stricter
rules. Specifically, we aim to assess the e↵ect of section 1325, paragraph 4, which was added to
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code under BAPCPA and imposes additional restrictions on the length of
repayment plans for debtors with income above the state median. In order to do so, we build and
estimate a structural model of Chapter 13 bankruptcy using a novel data set we construct. For
a side contribution, we provide empirical evidence regarding the outcomes under Chapter 13 and
its performance both as a collection device for creditors and as a means to provide debtors with
a financial fresh start.
Our model captures the salient features of personal bankruptcy under Chapter 13. In our
model, a debtor first makes decisions regarding whether or not to file under Chapter 13 and,
if so, what repayment plan to propose. Since the law requires that all of a debtor’s excess
income be applied to his repayment plan, the debtor’s choice of repayment plan boils down to its
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length2. In choosing what plan to propose, the debtor recognizes that its duration has a bearing
on the confirmation outcome that is determined by the recommendations of a bankruptcy trustee
appointed to oversee the bankruptcy process. Under the bankruptcy law, in deciding whether to
confirm a plan or not, the trustee must form an opinion as to the fairness and feasibility of the
plan. The fairness condition is satisfied as long as the debtor contributes all excess income into
the plan payments. The feasibility condition requires that the debtor’s excess income is su cient
to pay the unsecured creditors over a three- to five-year period an amount no less than they can
recover under liquidation of the debtor’s assets. To capture the idea that the trustee has some
leeway in the interpretation of the bankruptcy law, in our model, whether the trustee views a
given plan as fair and feasible or not is random from the perspective of the debtor. Specifically,
whether the trustee views a plan as fair and feasible depends on the debtor’s characteristics and
the plan length.
Even if a plan is initially confirmed, it may nonetheless become unfair or infeasible due to
fluctuations in the debtor’s financial condition. We model this possibility by introducing shocks
to income or expenses of the debtor at a random date. Following the shocks, the trustee reevaluates
the feasibility of the plan under the new debtor characteristics. If the case is not dismissed, the
debtor decides whether to continue or voluntarily default on his plan.
Overall, our model highlights a basic trade-o↵ debtors face in proposing long repayment plans
versus short ones. Long repayment plans are costly in that they impose restraints on debtors
for longer periods, but these plans may also be more likely to be confirmed by the court and,
ultimately, to result in a financial fresh start. In addition, our model highlights the importance
of shocks to excess income during the bankruptcy process. In particular, even though a plan may
be fair and feasible at the time a debtor files for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, it may cease to be so
later on before the repayment plan is complete.
We estimate our model using newly collected data contained in court files on all Chapter
13 personal bankruptcies recorded by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Delaware between August 2001 and August 2002. From the court documents, we extract infor-
2Excess income is income minus necessary expenses including housing payments either in the form of rent or in
the form of mortgages. Note that the mortgage debt that is not yet due is paid outside the Chapter 13 repayment
plan.
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mation concerning the filers’ financial and demographic information at the time of filing and the
final outcome of their cases. Specifically, we collect data on the outcomes predicted by our model:
the choice of plan length, whether the plan is confirmed or not, whether the case is success-
fully completed or not, and the recovery rate of the creditors.3 In addition to these endogenous
outcomes, in our model the decision to file for Chapter 13 in the first place is also endogenous.
Although all the debtors in our sample have chosen to file for Chapter 13, we identify the param-
eters associated with this decision through the variation in the decision to continue or voluntarily
default on the plan following the shocks to financial conditions.
We estimate our model using the maximum likelihood approach. Our estimates confirm that
the debtor’s choice of plan length indeed a↵ects the trustee’s opinions on the fairness and feasibility
of the plan. In particular, after controlling for exogenous debtor characteristics, we find that longer
plans are more likely to be confirmed in the first place and less likely to be dismissed after the
original plan becomes infeasible. However, whether a debtor’s income is above the state median
level does not play a significant role in the confirmation of the plan.4 As such, the means test
established under BAPCPA appears inconsequential. In addition, we find that the timing of the
changes in debtors’ conditions during bankruptcy play a significant role in governing Chapter 13
outcomes, including the ability of debtors to obtain a financial fresh start. In particular, when
negative shocks to income are experienced early in the program, the probability of dismissal rises
significantly.
We next conduct policy experiments to assess the e↵ect of section 1325, paragraph 4, that was
added to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code under BAPCPA. This policy imposes additional restrictions
on the length of payment plans for debtors with income above the state median. Our results
predict that this new policy would not materially a↵ect creditor recovery rates and would not
necessarily make discharge more likely for debtors with income above the state median. This
finding is robust to alternative policy experiments that require bankruptcy plans to meet stricter
standards in other ways, such as proposing a higher recovery rate. In fact, in these alternative
experiments, some Chapter 13 filers no longer choose to file, with the result that recovery rates
3Throughout the paper, by recovery rate of the creditors, we mean their recovery within Chapter 13. It is
possible that the creditors collect payments outside Chapter 13 as well. We return to this possibility in Section 7.3.
4Whether income is above the state median appears immaterial for the confirmation of the plan; however, income
plays an important role through the determination of excess income and therefore the required plan payments.
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and discharge rates even decline. It appears, therefore, that a stricter bankruptcy code can make
it more di cult for debtors to obtain a fresh start but without necessarily helping to raise creditor
recovery rates.
It is well understood that personal bankruptcy laws a↵ect credit markets, and therefore the
supply and demand for credit (Gropp, Scholz and White, 1997 and Lin and White, 2001), the
ability of households to insure against labor income risk (Athreya et al., 2012), their consumption
behavior (Filer and Fisher, 2005 and Grant, 2004), labor supply (Han and Li, 2007), mobility
(Elul and Subramanian, 2002), entrepreneurial activity (Meh and Terajima, 2008 and Mankart
and Rodano, 2015).
Given that the e↵ect of the personal bankruptcy laws on these economic outcomes is through
the decision to file for bankruptcy in the first place, it is important to understand the determinants
of households’ bankruptcy and default decisions. In early work Domowitz and Sartain (1999) use
a nested logit model to estimate consumers’ decisions to file for bankruptcy and their choice of
bankruptcy chapter but they take a reduced form approach for values of each of these decisions.
Gross and Souleles (2002) estimate a dynamic probit model of default using individuals’ credit
card account data and conclude that the increase in the bankruptcy filing rates between 1995
and 1997 cannot be explained by risk factors and economic conditions alone. In their analysis,
they do not distinguish between di↵erent default options. Using data from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics Fay, Hurst and White (2002) test whether households are more likely to file
for bankruptcy if the financial benefits from filing for bankruptcy is higher. They compute the
financial benefits from filing for bankruptcy using the Chapter 7 bankruptcy alternative alone. Our
paper contributes to the literature on household bankruptcy default decisions5 and complements
these papers by endogenizing the value of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy alternative using a structural
model that explicitly takes into account the choices made by the debtors within Chapter 13 and
the uncertainties they face.6 Moreover, by considering the particular channels through which
observable and unobservable debtor characteristics a↵ect bankruptcy outcomes, we are able to
provide an assessment on how changes in bankruptcy law might alter the outcomes in Chapter
5There are also related studies looking at bankruptcy filings at the state level. See, for example, Dick and
Lehnert (2010), Cornwell and Xu (2014) and Gross, Notowidigdo and Wang (2014).
6See Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and Rust (1996) and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010), and Keane et al. (2011)
for surveys of structural dynamic choice models.
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13, and therefore the value of filing for Chapter 13.
Like us, Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook (2003), Norberg and Velkey (2006) and White and
Zhu (2010) construct data on Chapter 13 bankruptcy filers using U.S. bankruptcy court files. The
focus of the first two papers are entirely descriptive, while White and Zhu (2010) focuses on the
debtors’ decisions to default on their mortgages and file for bankruptcy. By contrast, our main
focus is on the decisions of the debtors after filing for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
Finally, our paper also informs a literature in macroeconomics that has provided tractable
models relating documented empirical facts on consumer bankruptcy to aggregate considerations.
A number of these studies have used calibration and simulation exercises to explain observed
aggregate U.S. consumer bankruptcy filing rates and have evaluated the e↵ects of information,
financial innovation, and changes in bankruptcy laws on these rates and other economic aggre-
gates. Some papers in this literature either explicitly state that they model bankruptcy in a way
to capture Chapter 7, or model bankruptcy as loss of assets as opposed to loss of income thus re-
sembling Chapter 7 as opposed to Chapter 13 (e.g. Athreya, 2002; Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima
and R´ıos-Rull, 2007; Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt, 2007, 2011; Chatterjee and Gordon, 2012; and
Gordon, 2015). Others are agnostic about what happens after bankruptcy but include an implicit
or explicit cost as a function of income (e.g. Drozd and Nosal, 2008 and Sanchez, 2012). In that
sense, these papers can be interpreted as capturing some elements of Chapter 13. The only paper
we are aware of which explicitly distinguishes between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 is Li and Sarte
(2006) who model Chapter 7 as a loss of assets and Chapter 13 as a loss of income resulting in
full discharge of debt. As we show, only 44% of the debtors who file for Chapter 13 are able to
obtain discharge. Overall, the main di↵erence between the macro literature on bankruptcy and
our current paper is that we make use of micro data and we do not take Chapter 13 outcomes as
given.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents institutional details
associated with U.S. personal bankruptcy law as well as a summary of creditors’ options outside
bankruptcy. Section 3 provides a description of the data. Section 4 presents a structural model
of Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Section 5 presents econometric specification. Section 6 presents our
estimation results. Section 7 assesses the e↵ects of policy experiments directly related to BAPCPA
as well as hypothetical ones. Section 8 o↵ers some concluding remarks.
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2 Legal Background
This section first briefly reviews creditors’ legal remedies outside bankruptcy. It then ad-
dresses the main features of U.S. personal bankruptcy law focusing in detail on Chapter 13 court
procedures.
2.1 Creditors’ Legal Remedies Outside of Bankruptcy
When a debtor defaults on his debt obligations without explicitly filing for bankruptcy, secured
creditors, such as mortgage lenders or car loan lenders, seize property to recover what they are
owed. Unsecured creditors, such as credit card issuers, often start with making calls and writing
letters soliciting payments. They then typically sell their debts to collecting agencies. Unsecured
creditors also have the option to sue the debtor and obtain a court judgment against him. They
collect on the judgment by having the court order that the debtor’s employer take a portion of
his paycheck and remit that money to the sheri↵, who then forwards the payment appropriately.
This process is known as “wage garnishment.” Unsecured creditors can also potentially seize a
debtor’s bank account and/or foreclose on his home. State laws typically restrict the amount and
type of assets that can be seized to di↵erent degrees. Therefore, the process of seizing an account
or foreclosing on a property can be costly and, in practice, unsecured creditors rarely do so.
2.2 Main Features of U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law Prior to BAPCPA
U.S. personal bankruptcy law features two distinct procedures: Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.
Prior to BAPCPA, debtors had the right to choose between the two chapters.7 Chapter 7 is
often referred to as “liquidation.” Under Chapter 7, the debtor surrenders all assets above an
exemption level that varies across states. In exchange, he obtains the discharge of most of his
unsecured debt such as credit card debt, medical bills, personal loans, utility bills, etc.8 A debtor
cannot file again for Chapter 7 during the six years that follow the last filing. In contrast, Chapter
13 is formally known as “adjustment of debts of consumers with regular income.”Under Chapter
7Given the time span covered by our data set and the objectives of this paper, the basic features of personal
bankruptcy law we provide below predate the passage of the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform Act.
8Discharge prevents the creditors who are owed the discharged debts from taking any action against the debtor,
including any communication with the debtor regarding unpaid debts.
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13, a portion of a debtor’s future earnings are used to meet part of his debt obligations. The
repayment plan can last for a period of up to five years. While the debtor’s assets are una↵ected
under Chapter 13, at the end of the payment plan, any remaining debt is discharged. A debtor
is prevented from filing again under Chapter 13 for a period of 180 days following his last filing.
2.3 Bankruptcy Procedure under Chapter 13
A Chapter 13 case begins when a debtor files a petition with the bankruptcy court. This
petition gives a description of, among other information, the debtor’s assets, debts, income, and
expenditures. In the petition, the debtor also proposes a repayment plan that devotes all of
his excess income to the payment of unmet claims. Bankruptcy law defines excess income as
any income net of necessary living expenses including housing expenses, which is in the form of
mortgage payments for most of the debtors. In order to be confirmed by the court, the proposed
plan must provide to repay the debt over a three- to five-year period. It must also be filed in
good faith.9 In particular, the debtor must propose to pay at least as much as the value of the
assets creditors would have otherwise received under Chapter 7. Finally, the plan must cure any
default on secured debt at the time of filing before providing for payments to unsecured creditors.
Because the law requires debtors to devote all of their disposable income to the payment plan,
the key element of the repayment plan is the proposed plan length.
Upon the filing of a petition, a trustee is appointed by the bankruptcy court. The trustee
is responsible for evaluating and recommending whether or not to confirm a proposed plan. He
also works as a disbursing agent during the implementation of the plan, collecting payments from
debtors and distributing them to creditors. Within a month of the petition filing, the trustee
schedules a section 341 meeting. At this meeting, creditors are given an opportunity to ask
any questions regarding the debtor’s financial situation that may a↵ect the plan. Ultimately, the
trustee recommends to the court that a proposed plan either be confirmed, along with the implied
repayment schedule, or be dismissed.
If the plan is dismissed, the case ends. Creditors can resume legal remedies outside bankruptcy,
9Trustees typically ask Chapter 13 filers to start submitting periodic payments according to the plan as soon
as the plan is filed. Payments are distributed to creditors only if the plan is confirmed and are otherwise refunded.
This practice, together with other court rules, discourages debtors from staying in Chapter 13 bankruptcy without
a confirmed plan for too long.
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as described above, to pursue the repayment of their loans. If a repayment plan is confirmed, the
debtor starts making payments as specified in that plan.10 Once plan payments are completed, any
remaining debt is discharged. It is possible for a plan that is initially confirmed to be subsequently
altered. In particular, the debtor is free to prepay his debts in the event that his assets appreciate
or he receives additional income from an unexpected source, such as an inheritance. The debtor
can also potentially convert the case to a Chapter 7 filing, even after confirmation of the Chapter
13 plan, or voluntarily default on the confirmed plan and have the case dismissed. When a debtor
benefits from a substantial increase in income after confirmation of a repayment plan, the law
requires the debtor to increase his payments by the amount of additional income received (unless
expenses for basic maintenance have also changed). Ultimately, the final plan that is carried out
can look very di↵erent from the proposed and confirmed plan.
3 The Data
3.1 Data Collection
The data collected in this paper are obtained using an electronic public access service to case
and docket information from Federal Bankruptcy courts and the U.S. Party/Case Index. This
service is known as Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) and o↵ers bankruptcy
court information including i) a listing of all parties and participants including judges, attor-
neys, and trustees, ii) a chronology of the dates of case events entered in the case record, iii) a
claims registry, and iv) the types of documents filed for specific cases and imaged copies of these
documents.
The docket sheet together with the court files it contains allow us to extract information
concerning important dates that mark the Chapter 13 bankruptcy procedure, including the filing
date, the confirmation date, and the dismissal or discharge date, as well as filers’ financial and
income information at the time of filing and the final outcome of the case. The court files include
debtor petitions, attorney disclosure forms, statements of financial a↵airs, Chapter 13 plans, and
the trustee report. The debtor petitions contain di↵erent schedules, labeled A through J, that set
forth the financial situation of the debtor, including real property that is owned, other personal
10In Delaware, the trustee receives 6 percent of total payments made under a confirmed plan.
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assets in the form of furniture, cash, or insurance, liabilities such as secured debt and unsecured
priority debt (taxes), and maintenance expenses for food, clothes, and transportation, among
other basic expenses.
The court files are mostly PDF images from which information cannot be directly extracted us-
ing software. We manually collected all of our data by downloading these images and coding them
into a database. The data were entered twice and the corresponding entries were cross-checked.
The data were also checked against di↵erent sources where the same information was reported.
For instance, the summary of schedules provides headline numbers on filers’ assets, debts, income,
and expenditures, while petition schedules A through J provide the same information in greater
detail.
There were 1, 085 Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases filed in Delaware over our sample period
(August 2001 to August 2002). Of the 1, 085 cases, we deleted from our sample 134 cases that
have incomplete information resulting from either court recording or filing errors, and that were
therefore trivially dismissed. In addition, 130 cases were omitted from the data due to inconsistent
information filed by the debtors. Our final sample contains 821 cases, of which 364 (or 44 percent)
resulted in a discharge upon successful completion of the repayment plans while 457 cases were
dismissed under Chapter 13. Of the dismissed cases, 52 were later converted to Chapter 7 filings.
Table 1 summarizes this information.
3.2 Data Description
3.2.1 Selected Characteristics of Chapter 13 Debtors
Most of the variables we use in our analysis are directly available from the court files. Others
are constructed on the basis of these original variables.11 For comparison, demographics, employ-
ment status, and income information are obtained for the State of Delaware from the 2000 Census
and the Mortgage Bankers Association. We also report data on expenditures from the northeast
region of the 2001 Consumer Expenditure Survey. Balance sheet information at the national level
11One such variable is excess income. We don’t observe actual income in our data. However, we have information
on the proposed payment and the proposed pay length. Since in Chapter 13 bankruptcy the debtors need to put all
of their disposable income after paying out the necessary expenditures into bankruptcy, we construct excess income
using information from proposed payments and proposed pay lengths.
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is obtained from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.
The debtors in our sample are somewhat less likely to be unemployed than the average
Delaware resident, with approximately 4 percent of the filers being unemployed compared to
5 percent in Delaware. This is not surprising since Chapter 13 bankruptcy is designed for curing
the debts of individuals with regular income. What is more surprising is that about 5 percent of
the filers are self-employed. Average monthly household income for the debtors in our sample is
$2, 938, which falls short of Delaware’s average adjusted gross income by about 30 percent. Filers
for whom we have income data for both the current and previous year experience a nearly 20
percent average decline in income prior to filing.
The court files also provide information regarding debtors’ monthly expenses that define basic
maintenance under Chapter 13. Debtors in our sample spend on average $1,164 on housing
expenses (mortgage or rent). While housing expenses are shielded by law, a provision prohibits
debtors from boosting these expenses prior to filing. In our sample, housing expenses, including
expenses for home maintenance, account on average for 40 percent of total monthly expenses.12
Debtors in Chapter 13 spend about $442 a month on average for food and clothing, which is
considerably less than the $600 monthly average reported for the northeast region of the Consumer
Expenditure Survey. Food and clothing represent 19 percent of debtors’ monthly expenses in our
sample. The remaining categories that define maintenance expenses include alimony payments,13
insurance premia, medical expenditures, transportation expenses, and discretionary expenses.
Discretionary expenses include recreation and entertainment. These expenses are arguably the
least related to basic necessities and the most subject to interpretation by the trustee. In our
sample, however, discretionary expenses account for approximately 2.5 percent of total monthly
expenses on average.
We refer to a debtor as a repeat filer if he has filed for either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13
bankruptcy at least once prior to the current filing, since 1980. In our sample, about 24 percent
12About 87 percent of the debtors in our sample own their homes, which exceeds the 70 percent state home-
ownership rate. That said, over one-fifth of homeowners who file for bankruptcy have pending foreclosure lawsuits,
much higher than the state average foreclosure rate of 0.35 percent.
13Compared to their peers, Chapter 13 filers in our sample are less likely to be married, with 46 percent of the
sample being recorded as married versus 54 percent for the state of Delaware. Approximately 6 percent of the filers
listed alimony as part of either their monthly income or monthly expenses, thus suggesting a recent divorce.
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of the debtors are repeat filers and thus have already been exposed to the experience of bankruptcy.
As expected, the most striking aspect of Chapter 13 filers relates to their level of indebtedness.
Specifically, their median total debt, including mortgages, car loans, and credit card debt, is about
$121,852, around six times the national median, while their median total assets are $104,000,
less than half of the corresponding national median. Their median unsecured debt is $14,737,
compared to a national median of zero. Median arrears14 amount to $12,517. Together, total
debt in default for the median filer - arrears as well as unsecured debt - amounts to approximately
the debtor’s annual gross income. Specifically, the debtor with the median income earns $31,284
and the debtor with the median total debt in default owes $30,834 in past-due debt. By contrast,
the debtor with the median total debt, including mortgages, car loans, and credit card debt, owes
about $121,852. The large di↵erence is due to the fact that some of the debt is not in default.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the debtor characteristics we use in our analysis. As
can be seen from this table, monthly rent or mortgage payments average a little under $850 a
month, which amounts to about 31 percent of monthly income. For about 8.5 percent of filers,
medical debt constitutes over 10 percent of their total debt in default.15
About a quarter of filers have above-state-median-income at the time of filing. Moreover, on
average, the debtors in our sample have been in their current job for about five months. A little
over 1 percent of the filers did not hire an attorney. Those who did hired experienced attorneys in
the sense that their attorneys handled, on average, 94 cases in our sample. Finally, the majority
of the filers proposed long repayment plans (over four years), with the proposed recovery rates
over 65 percent.
To sum up, Chapter 13 filers in our sample tend to earn noticeably less than average and
are very heavily indebted. These observations are broadly consistent with previous findings in
the literature (see, for example, Domowitz and Sartain, 1999; Nelson, 1999; and Fay, Hurst and
White, 2002).
14Arrears are missed payments that are past due on a (secured) loan. This is particularly relevant for mortgage
debt in the case of consumer bankruptcy. For secured debt, the part of the debt that is in default is only the arrears.
15We calculate medical debts by flagging keywords such as “health,”“medical,”or “Labcorp,”that are listed for
either the debt type or the associated creditor.
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3.2.2 Outcomes under Chapter 13
Two of the key outcomes of the personal bankruptcy process are creditors’ recovery rate and
debtors’ ability to obtain a discharge. These outcomes depend crucially on the length of plans
that are chosen by debtors and whether these plans are confirmed16 by the trustee. Hence, this
paper focuses on these four quantifiable aspects of Chapter 13.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate noteworthy aspects of proposed Chapter 13 plans in our sample.
First, proposed plan lengths in Figure 1 are nearly bimodal, with the majority of filers proposing
either three-year or five-year plans. In what follows, we will refer to plans shorter than four years
as three-year plans and the plans longer than four years as five-year plans. The fact that a large
fraction (84 percent) of the debtors propose five-year plans is not surprising given that it often
takes at least three years for filers to repay arrears in full.
Second, there exists considerable variation in proposed creditor recovery rates. As shown
in Figure 2a, the majority of filers propose to repay at least half of their total debt in default.
The mean and median proposed recovery rates are close to 66 cents and 60 cents on the dollar,
respectively. Around 20 percent of filers propose to pay their creditors back in full.
Third, as illustrated in Figure 2b, these recovery rates are strikingly lower than those im-
plied by the proposed plans. An important reason for the discrepancy is that many debtors in
bankruptcy end up not carrying out their plans in full, either because they are dismissed by the
trustee at a later stage or because they voluntarily exit Chapter 13 before completing their plans.
Accordingly, the distribution of actual recovery rates looks very di↵erent, depending on whether
debtors completed Chapter 13 and were successfully discharged or not. This is shown in Figure
3a. Furthermore, Figure 3b illustrates that the proposed plan length also matters somewhat for
the distribution of recovery rates. Interestingly, although their average recovery rates are similar,
debtors that propose five-year plans are associated with a lower median recovery rate than those
that propose three-year plans. Specifically, the actual median recovery rates are 15 percent for
the debtors with five-year plans versus 19 percent for the debtors with three-year plans. One
possible reason is that debtors who seek to smooth their payments over longer periods could be
16Cases that are not confirmed are either converted to Chapter 7 or dismissed. Given the small number of
Chapter 7 conversions in our sample, we do not formally distinguish between dismissal and chapter conversion in
our analysis, even though a case that is converted to Chapter 7 may eventually be discharged under that chapter.
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the ones in greater financial distress.
The average recovery rate for the creditors is 29 percent, with a median recovery rate of 14
percent. The mean and median recovery rates conditional on the debtor being discharged are 59
percent and 55 percent, respectively.17 This recovery rate is the weighted average of the recovery
rates of the unsecured and secured creditors. The mean recovery rate on unsecured debt is 17
percent while the median is 0 percent. Conditional on discharge, the mean and median recovery
rates on unsecured debt are 38 percent and 25 percent, respectively. By contrast, the mean
recovery rate on secured debt is 49 percent while the median is 39 percent. By law, the recovery
rate on secured debt conditional on discharge must be 100 percent. The unconditional recovery
rate on secured claims is, however, lower than 100 percent for two reasons. First, when the debtor
does not obtain a discharge in Chapter 13, he does not necessarily pay his secured creditors in
full. Second, for secured debt other than mortgages (for example, car loans), it is possible that the
value of the claim is reduced during the bankruptcy proceedings through cram-down. Although
we do not have the data on cram-down, we do not expect the recovery rates we report to be too
di↵erent from the actual recovery rates since most of the secured debt is mortgage debt, which
cannot be crammed down.
The descriptive statistics for the variables we just discussed as well as the remaining outcomes
are summarized in Table 3. As can be seen, close to 20 percent of the cases in our sample are
dismissed without ever obtaining the confirmation of a plan, and only 55 percent of the confirmed
plans are carried out to completion. In summary, creditor recovery rates are considerably lower
than those that are first proposed. In addition, more than half of the debtors fail to obtain the
financial fresh start potentially a↵orded by the bankruptcy law. A natural question is this: what
debtor characteristics, or other aspects of Chapter 13, are associated with these outcomes? To
answer this question, the next section builds a structural model of Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
4 The Model
In this section, we model the behavior of debtors while they are in Chapter 13 bankruptcy,
taking as given trustees’ decision rules. We do not explicitly model the creditors’ problem since
they don’t actively participate in the bankruptcy process.
17Chapter 13 recovery rates are necessarily zero for cases that are dismissed without confirmation.
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Our analysis begins with a debtor’s decision to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 13. We let
F 2 {0, 1} denote the debtor’s decision to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, where F = 1 if and
only if the debtor files for Chapter 13. In order to be able to discharge his debts, the debtor
must propose a repayment plan, have it confirmed by the court, and carry it out in full. The
payo↵ of the debtor depends on the payments P he makes in Chapter 13 and whether or not he
obtains a discharge. We let D 2 {0, 1} denote the discharge outcome, where D = 1 if and only if
a discharge in Chapter 13 is obtained. The payo↵ from discharge is normalized to zero, and the
payo↵ from outside options (as well as exiting Chapter 13 without a discharge) is given by V (Z),
where Z denotes the predetermined debtor characteristics at the time of filing for bankruptcy.18
We assume that the payo↵ of the debtor is additively separable over payments and the discharge
outcome and that it is given by u(P,D) =  P + (1 D)V (Z).
Since the law requires all of the debtor’s excess income to be applied to the repayment plan,
he has little say over per-period plan payments, and these are treated as exogenous. As discussed
in the previous section, discretionary expenses account for a negligible fraction of the monthly
expenses. As such, we assume the monthly payment amount is exogenously given by the excess
income, denoted by X, and the debtor’s choice regarding the plan consists solely of its length. We
assume the debtor can propose either a three-year (short-term) plan or a five-year (long-term)
plans and we denote the plan length by L.19
Once a plan is proposed, a trustee must decide whether or not to confirm the proposed plan.
We assume that the trustee is nonstrategic and that his decision rule is exogenous, which the
debtor takes as given. In addition, we assume that the decision rule is stochastic. This captures
the idea that the interpretation of the bankruptcy law is not entirely unambiguous, and the trustee
has some leeway in the interpretation of its provisions. How the trustee interprets the ambiguous
provisions is unobservable to the debtor. We let C 2 {0, 1} denote the confirmation outcome,
where C = 1 if and only if the plan is confirmed. At the time the trustee makes the decision to
confirm the case or not, he observes the plan length L and the debtor characteristics Z, and his
18Since payments (if any) made outside Chapter 13 are not available, the payo↵ from outside options that do
not involve Chapter 13 must be estimated.
19While this assumption is made for simplicity, it is consistent with the observed distribution of proposed plan
lengths being highly bimodal around these two values (recall Figure 1).
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confirmation decision rule is characterized by the probability Pr(C|L).20
If the plan is confirmed, then the debtor starts making payments according to the plan. In
particular, he is expected to pay his excess income X in each period t 2 {1, . . . , L}. However,
his excess income may change during bankruptcy due to unexpected shocks.21 Specifically, we
assume the existence of an additive shock ⌘ 2 R to excess income. In addition, we assume the
timing of this shock is random and given by ⌧ 2 [0, L].
We assume that once the shocks to excess income are realized, the trustee reevaluates the
plan in light of the changes to the excess income and thus to the per-period payment amount
and therefore to the total payments. Specifically, the total plan payments are now given by
X⌧ + (L  ⌧)(X + ⌘). As before, we take the trustee’s decision rule as exogenous and stochastic.
We let S 2 {0, 1} denote the trustee’s reevaluation outcome, where S = 1 if and only if the
trustee dismisses the case. At the time the trustee makes the decision to dismiss the case or not,
he observes the shock ⌘ to excess income and its timing ⌧ in addition to the plan length L and
the debtor characteristics Z. We let Pr(S|L, ⌘, ⌧) denote the probability that characterizes the
dismissal decision rule by the trustee.22
Even if a plan is not dismissed by the trustee at ⌧ , the debtor may decide to voluntarily exit
Chapter 13 bankruptcy without a discharge. We let E 2 {0, 1} denote the debtor’s decision to
exit Chapter 13, where E = 1 if and only if the debtor voluntarily exits Chapter 13 following the
realization of the shock to his excess income.23
Figure 4 summarizes the timing of events. First, the debtor chooses F . If F = 1, then the
debtor chooses L. Given L, the confirmation outcome C is realized. If C = 1, the shocks ⌘ and
⌧ are realized followed by the realization of the dismissal outcome S. If S = 0, then the debtor
chooses E. The decisions F,L, and E together with the realizations of random variables C, S, ⌘,
20In our estimation, we allow this probability to depend on the debtor characteristics Z as well. We suppress
this dependency in our notation.
21For example, once a plan is confirmed, a debtor may switch employment, gain additional income in the form
of inheritance, or obtain access to refinancing on secured debt. These changes can in principle be observed by the
trustee, but they are not documented and therefore are unavailable to us.
22As before, in our estimation, we allow this probability to depend on the debtor characteristics Z as well.
23Note that this decision resembles the decision to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the first place. Since in our
data set we observe only people who chose to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the debtor’s decision to exit Chapter
13 or not plays an important role in our identification.
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and ⌧ determine whether the debtor obtains a discharge D, as well as the payments P made in
Chapter 13 bankruptcy. We explain this next.
4.1 Discharge and Payment Outcomes under Chapter 13
If the debtor does not file for Chapter 13 (F = 0), then the debtor obtains no discharge, and
the payments in Chapter 13 are zero, i.e., D = 0 and P = 0. If F = 1, then there are four cases:
(i) If the case is not confirmed (C = 0), then the case is terminated without a discharge, and
the creditors do not collect anything in Chapter 13. Consequently D = 0 and P = 0 in this
case.
(ii) If the case is confirmed (C = 1), but gets dismissed (S = 1) after the shocks to debtor’s
excess income are realized, the debtor fails to obtain a discharge, D = 0. In this case, the
payments in Chapter 13 consist of the payments made up to the realization of the shock to
excess income at time ⌧ , that is, P = X⌧ .
(iii) When the case is confirmed (C = 1), is not dismissed (S = 0), but the debtor voluntarily
exits Chapter 13 following the realization of the shock to his excess income (E = 1), then
the case is not dismissed at time ⌧ , we have D = 0 and P = X⌧ .
(iv) If C = 1, S = 0, and E = 0, then the debtor decides to remain in bankruptcy and his
payments are modified to X + ⌘. Because he already paid X per year until time ⌧ , and he
pays X + ⌘ per year from ⌧ to L, and because he does not need to pay more than what he
owes, the total payment in this case is P = min{X⌧ + (X + ⌘)(L  ⌧), B}, where B is the
total debt in default at the time of filing for bankruptcy.24 In this case, the debtor obtains
a discharge, and so D = 1.
Note that, the variables F , L and E are determined as the solution to the debtor’s dynamic
optimization problem. We next discuss how these variables are determined.
24As mentioned earlier, the trustee collects a 6 percent fee from the total payments. To account for this, we
adjust the amount of total debt in default.
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4.2 The Debtor’s Problem
In this section, we characterize the debtor’s optimal choices bF , bL, and bE using backward
induction. First, consider the debtor’s choice of bE at time ⌧ after his excess income becomes
X + ⌘. If the debtor decides to exit bankruptcy, his utility is given by  X⌧ + V (Z 0), where Z 0
reflects the debtor’s new characteristics at time ⌧ , after taking into account the reduction in his
debt due to the payments he has already made, and his new excess income, taking into account
the shock ⌘ it received. If the debtor decides to remain in bankruptcy, his utility is given by
 min{X⌧ +(X + ⌘)(L  ⌧), B}. As such, bE = 0 if and only if  min{X⌧ +(X + ⌘)(L  ⌧), B}  
 X⌧ + V (Z 0).25
Next consider the debtor’s choice of plan length. This choice has two consequences. First, it
a↵ects the probability that the plan will be confirmed. Second, it a↵ects the payo↵ conditional
on the plan being confirmed. Let V (L) denote this conditional payo↵.26 Formally, we have
V (L) = E⌘,⌧ [Pr(S = 1|L, ⌘, ⌧)[ X⌧ + V (Z 0)]
+ Pr(S = 0|L, ⌘, ⌧)[max{ min{X⌧ + (X + ⌘)(L  ⌧), B}, X⌧ + V (Z 0)}].
(1)
The debtor’s choice of plan length must maximize his expected utility, i.e.,
(2) bL 2 argmax
L2{3,5}
Pr(C = 1|L)V (L) + (1  Pr(C = 1|L))V (Z).
Finally, the debtor’s choice of filing must be optimal. Assuming that the debtor files for
Chapter 13 when indi↵erent, we have bF = 1 if and only if Pr(C = 1|bL)V (bL) + (1   Pr(C =
1|bL))V (Z)   V (Z) or, equivalently, if and only if V (bL)   V (Z).
We now turn to our empirical specification.
25We assume that the debtor remains in bankruptcy when indi↵erent. Under the assumptions we make on the
distribution of ⌘ in the next section, this is a zero probability event.
26Of course, this payo↵ depends on the debtor characteristics Z as well, which we suppress.
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5 Econometric Specification
5.1 Likelihood Function
The solution of the optimization problem just discussed serves as the input into estimating
the parameters of the model given data on choices made by the debtors and the confirmation and
discharge outcomes. As mentioned earlier, for each individual in the data, we observe the choice
of plan length bL, discharge outcome D, confirmation outcome C, and the recovery rate of their
creditors, which is equivalent to observing the payments P . The contribution to the likelihood
function of each debtor in our sample is therefore equal to the probability of observing (bL,C, P,D)
conditional on the vector of (exogenous) debtor characteristics Z, and the model’s parameters  .27
Given the optimization decisions faced by debtors under Chapter 13, the likelihood of each debtor
can be written as
(3) Pr(bL,C, P,D|Z, ) = Pr(bL|Z, ) Pr(C|bL;Z, ) Pr(P,D|C, bL;Z, ).
The sample likelihood is the product of the probabilities in (3) over all the debtors in the data
set. The remainder of this section addresses each of the components on the right-hand side of
(3), suppressing the conditioning on Z and  .
Although the choice of plan length is deterministic for the debtor, it is probabilistic from our
view since we do not have the same information the debtor has. A debtor’s health or educational
status, for instance, may a↵ect the probability of a plan being confirmed, which in turn a↵ects
the choice of plan length. To reconcile any potential discrepancy between the model’s predictions
and observed plan length choices, we allow for the fact that the debtor evaluates the probability
Pr(C = 1|L) of confirmation of the proposed plan L using information that is unavailable to
us. We let "L denote a multiplicative error term that lets us di↵erentiate between the debtors’
probability assessment of initial plan confirmation and the analogous evaluation made by us.
27The expected payo↵ from filing under Chapter 13 is also endogenous in the model. As explained later in this
section, the vector of endogenous events therefore implicitly takes into account the fact that all debtors in our
sample have chosen to file under that chapter.
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Hence, the true conditional probability of confirmation is given by
(4) Pr(C = 1|L, "L) = Q(C = 1|L)"L,
where Q(C = 1|L) reflects our assessment of initial plan confirmation and is parameterized below.
We assume that "L is distributed with a cumulative distribution function G("L|L) with support
EL. (The fact that the probability of confirmation lies in [0, 1] imposes restrictions on EL. We
discuss these restrictions explicitly in the next section.) Although the debtor’s estimate of the
confirmation probability of his proposed plan uses more information than is available to us, there
is no a priori reason why our estimate of Pr(C = 1|L) should be biased. Therefore, we require
that E("L) = 1 8L, which immediately implies that
(5) Pr(C = 1|L) = E[Pr(C = 1|L, "L)] = Q(C = 1|L).
From (2) and (5), it follows that
Q(C = 1|bL)"bLV (bL) + (1 Q(C = 1|bL)"bL)V (Z)
  Q(C = 1|L)"LV (L) + (1 Q(C = 1|L)"L)V (Z)
(6)
for all L 6= bL. Since this is trivially satisfied when L = bL. There are three cases to consider:
(i) If V (bL) < V (Z), then Pr(bL) = 0. This is because the expected payo↵ V (bL) from filing
under Chapter 13 is endogenous in the model, and for the debtor to be observed in the data set,
we must have V (bL)   V (Z).
(ii) If V (L) < V (Z) and V (bL)   V (Z), the left-hand side of (6) is at least as large as V (Z)
and the right-hand side of (6) is less than V (Z). Thus (6) is always satisfied regardless of "bL and
"L, implying Pr(bL) = 1.
(iii) If V (L)   V (Z), then (6) implies that
Pr(bL|"bL) = Pr
 
"L 
Q(C = 1|bL)"bL(V (bL)  V (Z))
Q(C = 1|L)(V (L)  V (Z))
      "bL
!
,
= G
 
Q(C = 1|bL)"bL(V (bL)  V (Z))
Q(C = 1|L)(V (L)  V (Z))
     L
!
,
(7)
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and therefore
(8) Pr(bL) = Z
EbL
G
 
Q(C = 1|bL)"bL(V (bL)  V (Z))
Q(C = 1|L)(V (L)  V (Z))
     L
!
dG("bL|bL).
This completes the derivation of Pr(C|bL) and Pr(bL), the first two terms on the right-hand
side of (3). We now turn to the derivation of the last term, i.e., the derivation of Pr(P,D|C, bL),
making use of the discussion in Section 4.1.
First, consider the case when C = 0. In this case, we have
(9) Pr(P,D|C = 0, bL) =
8><>: 1 if P = 0 and D = 0,0 otherwise.
Next, consider the case C = 1. Note that, in this case, the payment P and the discharge
outcome D depend on the realization of the random variables ⌘ and ⌧ . Since we do not observe
the realization of these variables, we integrate them out:
(10) Pr(P,D|C = 1, bL) = E⌘,⌧{Pr(P,D|C = 1, bL, ⌘, ⌧)}.
When C = 1 and D = 0, there are two possibilities. Either S = 1, which happens with
probability Pr(S = 1|bL, ⌘, ⌧), or S = 0 and E = 1, which happens with probability Pr(S =
0|bL, ⌘, ⌧) when
(11)  min{X⌧ + (X + ⌘)(bL  ⌧), B} <  X⌧ + V (Z 0).
Although we do not observe S and E per se, in both of these cases, we must have P = X⌧
and D = 0. Since we know the excess income X, observing the total payment P allows us to infer
the realized value of ⌧ . Substituting it in (11), we obtain
Pr(P,D = 0|C = 1, bL) = f⌧ ✓P
X
◆
1
X
E⌘
⇢
Pr(S = 1|bL, ⌘, P
X
)
+ Pr(S = 0|bL, ⌘, P
X
)
✓
 min{P + (X + ⌘)(bL  P
X
), B} <  P + V (Z 0)
◆ 
.
(12)
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where f⌧ denotes the density function of ⌧ and (.) is an indicator function that takes the value
1 when the statement in parentheses is true.28
Finally, when C = 1 and D = 1, we must have S = 0 and E = 0, which happens with
probability Pr(S = 0|bL, ⌘, ⌧) when
(13)  min{X⌧ + (X + ⌘)(bL  ⌧), B}    X⌧ + V (Z 0).
In this case, we observe full debt repayment if and only if X⌧ + (X + ⌘)(bL   ⌧)   B or,
alternatively, ⌘   (B  X bL)/(bL  ⌧). Therefore,
Pr(P = B,D = 1|C = 1, bL) = E⌘,⌧(Pr(S = 0|bL, ⌘, ⌧)
⇣
 min{X⌧ + (X + ⌘)(bL  ⌧), B}    X⌧ + V (Z 0)⌘       ⌘   B  X bL(bL  ⌧)
)
.
(14)
By contrast, when we observe less than full payment, i.e., for P < B, we must have P = X⌧ +
(X + ⌘)(bL  ⌧) and consequently ⌘ = (P  X bL)/(bL  ⌧). Therefore, for P < B, we have
Pr(P,D = 1|C = 1, bL) = E⌧ (f⌘  P  X bL
(bL  ⌧)
!
1
(bL  ⌧)
Pr(S = 0|bL, P  X bL
(bL  ⌧) , ⌧)  P    X⌧ + V (Z 0) 
)
.
(15)
5.2 Parametrization
In order to maximize the likelihood function (3), several objects must first be parameterized,
taking into account the restrictions implied by both our model and the econometric specification.
These objects relate to the conditional probability of initial plan confirmation, Q(C|L,Z), the
probability of dismissal after the shocks ⌘ and ⌧ are realized, Pr(S = 1|L, ⌘, ⌧, Z), the payo↵
from outside options, V (Z), the density functions that govern the shocks ⌘ and ⌧ , f⌘(⌘|L,Z) and
f⌧ (⌧ |L,Z), respectively, and the distribution of "L, G("L|L,Z).
28Note that, as discussed earlier, Z0 depends on ⌘ and ⌧ .
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We assume Q(C|L,Z) is specified as a logistic function:
(16) Q(C = 1|L;Z) = e
q(L,Z)
1 + eq(L,Z)
,
where
q(L,Z) =  c0 +  
c
1L+  
c
2ratio asset debt
+  c3ratio arrears debt+  
c
4ratio rent mortgage inc
+  c5medical debt+  
c
6job tenure
+  c7inc above med+  
c
8repeat filer
+  c9attorney exp+  
c
10p recovery rate
+  c11eligible 7,
and the  Ci ’s are parameters to be estimated.
29
We next discuss the parametrization of G("L|L,Z). We assume G("L|L,Z) is specified by a
power distribution, i.e.,
(17) G("L|L,Z) = ["LQ(C = 1|L,Z)]'(L,Z).
for "L 2 EL. To ensure that the conditional probability P (C = 1|L,Z) of plan confirmation lies
in [0, 1], the support of "L must be bounded. In addition, recall that we assume E("L) = 1 8L.
Thus, we require that EL = [0, 1/Q(C = 1|L,Z)] and '(L,Z) = Q(C = 1|L,Z)/[1 Q(C = 1|L,Z)]. These
restrictions, therefore, tie down both the shape and the support of G("L|L,Z).
We assume Pr(S = 1|L, ⌘, ⌧, Z) is also specified as a logistic function,
(18) Pr(S = 1|L, ⌘, ⌧, Z) = e
d(L,Z,⌘,⌧)
1 + ed(L,Z,⌘,⌧)
,
29All the observed variables are defined in Table 4.
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where
d(L,Z, ⌘, ⌧) =  d0 +  
d
1L+  
d
2ratio asset debt+  
d
3ratio arrears debt
+  d4ratio rent mortgage inc+  
d
5medical debt+  
d
6job tenure
+  d7 inc above med+  
d
8repeat filer
+  d9attorney exp+  
d
10discharge recovery rate
+  d11eligible 7 +  
d
12dismiss recovery rate
+  d13⌘ +  
d
14⌧.
We estimate the payo↵ from outside options as
(19) V (Z) =  D1 arrears+  
D
2 unsecured debt+  
D
3 assets+  
D
4 homeowner.
This specification allows for the possibility that debtors’ payo↵ from outside options decreases
with both the amount of debt they carry and the amount of assets that would have otherwise
been protected under Chapter 13. In addition, we define a debtor’s payo↵ from outside options
after taking debtor’s new characteristics at time ⌧ into account as follows:
V (Z 0) =  D1 max{arrears X⌧, 0}+  D2 (unsecured debt max{X⌧   arrears, 0})
+  D3 assets+  
D
4 homeowner.
(20)
This means that at time ⌧ , the debtor’s arrears and unsecured debt are updated based on the
payment he has made until that point in the repayment plan. Notice that the debtor first pays
back his arrears before starting to make payments on the unsecured debt.
We assume that ⌧ has a power distribution with density
(21) f⌧ (⌧ |L) =  
⌧
L⌧
 ⌧L 1
L 
⌧
L
for ⌧ 2 [0, L].
Finally, we assume ⌘ is normally distributed with density
(22) f⌘(⌘|L,Z) = 1q
2⇡ ( ⌘(L,Z))
2
exp
✓
 (⌘   µ⌘(L,Z))
2
2( ⌘(L,Z))2
◆
,
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where
µn(L,Z) = ↵
⌘
0 + ↵
⌘
1L+ ↵
⌘
2medical debt+ ↵
⌘
3job tenure,
and
 n(L,Z) =  
⌘
0 +  
⌘
1L+  
⌘
2medical debt+  
⌘
3 job tenure.
The family of distribution functions we choose has enough flexibility to capture any potential
e↵ects of a debtor’s plan length choice and characteristics on the likelihood that his case will be
confirmed and discharged, as well as the determination of his implied recovery rate.
5.3 Identification
The identification of the parameters of the model relies on a combination of functional form
and distributional assumptions as well as two sets of exclusion restrictions. First, for the cases
that are confirmed but not carried to completion, we cannot observe whether they exit Chapter
13 voluntarily or dismissed by the trustee. As such, we need to impose exclusion restrictions
in order to be able to separately identify the parameters of the probability of dismissal and the
payo↵ associated with options outside of Chapter 13.
The first set of exclusion restrictions necessitates the existence of at least one variable that
a↵ects the probability of dismissal while not a↵ecting the payo↵ a debtor receives from outside
options. Since the probability of dismissal captures the trustee’s decision in a reduced form way,
such a variable must be of consequence to the trustee. As mentioned earlier, the Chapter 13
Trustee for the District of Delaware emphasized to us the importance of fairness and feasibility
as the most important criteria for confirming plans and allowing them to continue. Since debtors
with longer job tenure are more likely to have more stable jobs (Farber, 2010), it is indeed relevant
for the feasibility of the plan. At the same time, both fairness and feasibility are hard to quantify,
and an experienced attorney may have a crucial role to play in persuading the trustee about the
fairness and feasibility. Outside options of the debtors, on the other hand, involve either filing
under Chapter 7 or defaulting on their loans. An attorney hired for Chapter 13 filing plays no
role in these outside options. Likewise, it seems reasonable to assume that the payo↵ from these
alternatives do not depend on job tenure.
The second set of restrictions requires the existence of at least one variable to shift the payo↵
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associated with options outside of Chapter 13 while not changing the probability of dismissal.
We use the dummy variable indicating whether a debtor is a homeowner or not for this exclusion
restriction. When evaluating the modified plan, the trustee may potentially take into account
the market value of assets of a debtor to ensure fairness. This is because the fairness criteria
requires that the plan pays the creditors at least as much as they would collect if the debtor had
filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. Nevertheless, after taking into account the market value
of assets or the housing expenses (rents or mortgage payments of a debtor), whether the debtors
is a homeowner or not should not carry extra information for the trustee. On the other hand, a
debtor may attach additional value to his home over and above its financial value. Since there
is a high likelihood of losing his home under the options outside of Chapter 13, we believe that
the probability of dismissal does not vary with the fact that whether the debtor is a homeowner
while the payo↵ associated with the outside options does.
The timing and the amount of the shocks to excess income are backed out from the observed
recovery rates of the debtors. Recall that the amount of payment a debtor makes if a case is
dismissed at time ⌧ is equal to X⌧ . Since we can observe the excess income of the debtors
in the data, we construct the distribution of ⌧ from the creditor recovery rates from dismissed
cases. Also recall that the amount of payment a debtor makes if a case is discharged is equal to
max{X⌧+(L ⌧)(X+⌘), B}. Therefore, once we have the distribution of ⌧ at hand, it is possible
to back out the distribution of ⌘ using the observed creditor recovery rates from discharged cases.
This is possible because we observe the amount of total debt in default, excess income and plan
length in the data.
Finally, the parameters of the confirmation probability Q(C = 1|L;Z) are identified using
data on confirmation rates through the variation in di↵erent characteristics of the debtors and
plan lengths.
Finally, the parameters associated with the choice of filing for bankruptcy in the first place is
identified based on the payo↵ associated with options outside of Chapter 13 and the fact that all
the debtors in our sample filed for Chapter 13. Although we don’t observe any debtors who have
chosen not to file for Chapter 13, we identify the parameters associated with this decision through
the variation in the decision to continue or voluntarily default on the plan following the shocks
to financial conditions. Therefore by assuming that filing for Chapter 13 and exiting Chapter 13
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entail the same decision-making process except for the changes in the debtor’s financial conditions,
we are able to identify Fˆ .
6 Results
6.1 Parameter Estimates
Tables 5, 6, and 7 present the maximum likelihood estimates of the model’s parameters. Specif-
ically, Table 5 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the confirmation
probability Q(C = 1|L,Z) given by (16), Table 6 presents the estimates of the parameters of
the dismissal probability Pr(S = 1|L, ⌘, ⌧, Z) given by equation (18), and Table 7 presents the
estimates of the parameters of the outside payo↵ V (Z) given by (19), the distribution of the shock
⌘ given by (22), and the distribution of its timing ⌧ given by (21).
These estimates allow us to directly answer two questions of interest. First, what debtor
characteristics significantly influence the likelihood that a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan will be
confirmed by the bankruptcy court? In a related vein, do these characteristics still matter at a
later bankruptcy stage as the debtor’s circumstances have changed and the trustee reevaluates
the plan? With the answers to these questions, we can indirectly infer how particular debtor
attributes a↵ect creditor recovery rates.
6.1.1 Plan Length
Table 5 indicates that, all else equal, long-term plans are more likely to be initially approved
by the trustee than are short-term plans. Longer plans typically imply higher proposed recovery
rates in our sample. Even after controlling for the proposed recovery rate, the probability of a
proposed plan being confirmed is higher when the proposed plan length is longer.
In addition, as can be seen from Table 6, longer plans make it less likely that the plan will be
dismissed later on in the bankruptcy.
6.1.2 Borrowers’ Characteristics
Recall that a Chapter 13 plan must propose to pay all arrears in order for a plan to be
confirmed and must be able to pay them all in order to be discharged. As a result, having
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considerable arrears in relation to total debt in default decreases the confirmation probability and
increases the dismissal probability.
Having a high housing expense relative to monthly income decreases the confirmation prob-
ability and increases the dismissal probability. This is consistent with our conversations with
the Chapter 13 Trustee for the District of Delaware, who emphasized the importance of fairness
and feasibility as the most important criteria for confirming plans and allowing them to continue.
Recall that the bankruptcy law requires the debtors to pay all of their excess income to the Chap-
ter 13 plan, and excess income is calculated after taking out all expenses, including the housing
expense. A high housing expense relative to monthly income may be viewed as a luxurious con-
sumption at the expense of creditors and thus not fair. In addition, a high housing expense makes
the debtor more vulnerable to negative shocks to excess income, making it more di cult for him
to pay the arrears in full and therefore less likely to pass the feasibility test.
A longer job tenure suggests some degree of stability in the debtor’s financial situation. As a
result, the plan is more likely to be feasible when the debtor has a longer job tenure. Consistent
with this, longer job tenure increases the probability that the trustee will confirm the plan and
decreases the dismissal probability.
The fact that a debtor is a repeat filer decreases the probability that his plan will be confirmed.
There are two main reasons for why a debtor might be a repeat filer. First, a debtor whose case is
not initially confirmed has little chance of seeing his financial situation improve without outside
help and, by law, he must wait at least 180 days before attempting a new filing. A repeat
filer, therefore, could simply be someone who is unable to extricate himself from a dire financial
situation on his own. Second, a repeat filer might be someone who abuses the bankruptcy system
by periodically filing for bankruptcy and discharging his debt. One would think that a debtor
who is in the first category is more likely to file for bankruptcy as soon as that option becomes
available to him, whereas a debtor in the second category is more likely to strategically acquire
debt first and delay bankruptcy filing. In our data set, 88 percent of repeat filers had their
previous filings around 180 days prior to the current bankruptcy filing and hence fall in the first
category. For the rest of the filers, we are unable to identify the reasons for their repeat filing
behavior. It is possible that the same nonstrategic cause (for example, health problems) is the
reason for multiple bankruptcy filings. Although we do not observe the cause for the repeat filing,
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the trustee has access to much more information. Regardless of the cause, being a repeat filer
reduces the likelihood of confirmation. One possibility is that debtors in the first category are
unlikely to propose feasible plans, whereas debtors in the second category are unlikely to propose
fair plans.
Having an experienced attorney helps to have a plan confirmed, but it also increases the
probability of dismissal after the debtor’s financial situation changes. Recall that we measure
attorney experience by the number of cases in the sample associated with the attorney representing
the debtor. One would expect that more experienced attorneys have higher demand for their
services and better bargaining power regarding their fee structure. In the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Delaware, the fee charged by an attorney for a Chapter 13 case must be
approved by the bankruptcy court. The structure of the fee, however, is not defined by the law.
In particular, the attorneys can ask to be paid prior to or after filing the case and can stipulate
whether the fee is to be paid directly by the debtor or by the Chapter 13 trustee. The court then
approves a fee it finds to be reasonable. If more experienced attorneys charge fees that are mostly
front-loaded, then they may prefer to devote less of their time to cases that are already confirmed
and have less time to finish, since less fees can then be collected. As such, it is not surprising that
having an experienced attorney is helpful initially but may backfire later on in the case.
6.1.3 Shocks
Notably, Table 6 also indicates that the trustee puts significant weight on information regarding
changes in the debtor’s conditions after initial confirmation of his plan. The likelihood of dismissal
falls with ⌧ , since the longer a debtor has stuck by his initial plan before facing a change in
circumstances, the more he has already contributed to this plan. However, the likelihood of
dismissal does not change with the level of the shock ⌘. This means that, after controlling for the
observable characteristics that determine the distribution of ⌘, the level of the shock itself does
not carry any additional information for the decision of the trustee.
The parameters governing the distributions of ⌘ and ⌧ are reported in Table 7. We estimate
that, on average, debtors who file for long-term plans are more likely to experience a negative
shock to their excess incomes during bankruptcy, although the variation seems economically in-
significant. Specifically, keeping everything else constant, the debtors experience a $14 decline,
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on average, as a result of filing for longer plans. Filing for a long-term plan also increases the
standard deviation of ⌘ by $68 on average, conditional on observable debtor characteristics such
as job tenure, whether the medical debt of the debtor exceeds 10 percent of the total debt in
default, and whether the debtor has previously filed for bankruptcy. On the other hand, having
a longer job tenure increases the mean of the excess income shock in addition to decreasing the
standard deviation of the shock. Many debtors with longer job tenures have more stable jobs, and
thus they have less volatility in their excess income during the length of their repayment plans.
6.1.4 Payo↵ from Outside Options
Finally, Table 7 indicates that the payo↵ obtained outside Chapter 13 decreases with the
updated level of arrears, assets and unsecured debt held at the time of exit. Moreover, homeowners
receive a lower payo↵ from options outside of Chapter 13. This is because once a filer is no longer
eligible under Chapter 13, his assets are no longer protected and thus creditors can seize property
to recover what they are owed. In fact, secured creditors are more likely to aggressively seek a
filer’s assets when the assets are more valuable and the secured debt (i.e., arrears) is higher.
6.2 E↵ects of Debtor Characteristics on the Distribution of Recovery Rates
The second question of interest in this section relates to the e↵ects of specific debtor char-
acteristics on Chapter 13 outcomes and, in particular, on the distribution of creditor recovery
rates.30 For example, given that we have identified being a repeat filer as a significant variable
in the trustee’s confirmation and dismissal decisions, what are the implications for the distribu-
tion of recovery rates? In answering this question, the lens provided by the particular model at
hand is crucial since the distribution of the recovery rates depends not only on the exogenous
characteristics of debtors, but also on the endogenous decisions they make. The model allows us
to create a data set of artificial debtors that resembles the raw data in all dimensions but one,
say, being a repeat filer, by bootstrapping from observed debtor characteristics (outside of being
a repeat filer). Having created these artificial debtors, we can then explore, using the estimated
model, how the distribution of recovery rates changes depending on whether, in addition, these
30In our model and in our empirical specification, we focused on the payment P . We present our results below
in terms of the recovery rates to make them comparable across debtors with di↵erent levels of debt.
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debtors are assumed to be repeat filers.31
Figure 5 presents the model-generated distributions of recovery rates conditional on debtor
characteristics. Figure 5a illustrates how the distribution of creditor recovery rates changes de-
pending on one’s experience with bankruptcy. We can see that repeat filers are generally associated
with lower recovery rates, with 63 percent of debtors repaying between 0 percent to 20 percent of
their debt. In contrast, only 51 percent of debtors are associated with the lowest recovery rates
among first-time filers. More generally, creditors recover 33 percent of what they are owed on
average from first-time filers, but only 23 percent from repeat filers. Similarly, Figure 5b depicts
changes in the distribution of recovery rates depending on the amount of arrears debtors hold
as a fraction of their total debt in default. Debtors for whom arrears constitute 25 percent of
their debt (arrears being equal to 25 percent of debt corresponds to the 25th percentile in the
raw data) are associated with a 35 percent average recovery rate, and 48 percent of those debtors
repay between 0 percent and 20 percent of their debt. In contrast, when debtors hold arrears
equal to 69 percent of their debt (arrears being equal to 69 percent of debt corresponds to the
75th percentile in the raw data), the average recovery rate falls to 29 percent, while the measure
of debtors repaying less than 20 percent increases by 10 percentage points.32
Finally, Figure 5c illustrates the extent to which the distribution of recovery rates changes
conditional on debtors having a given ratio of excess (annual) income to debt. This measure
essentially determines what debtors can potentially repay depending on the plan length they
choose. Debtors in the lowest 25th percentile, those with excess income representing 8 percent of
their debt, repay 23 percent of what they owe on average. Debtors in the highest 25th percentile,
those whose excess income represents 19 percent of their debt, are associated with a considerably
higher 42 percent average recovery rate.33
31See Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (2003) for alternative applications of this procedure in a political economy
context and in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy environment, respectively.
32More specifically, we first calculate the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile of the distribution for the ratio
of arrears to debt in default. We then bootstrap a data set of artificial debtors from the raw data such that all
characteristics of debtors resemble the raw data while the values for the ratio of arrears to debt is set to the 25th
percentile of the distribution in the raw data. Next, we repeat this procedure and construct another data set of
artificial debtors, where the values for the ratio of arrears to debt are set to the 75th percentile of the distribution
in the raw data.
33The method for constructing the data with artificial debtors is similar to that used in creating Figures 5a and
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Figure 6 provides lower and upper bounds in terms of what creditors can expect to recover in
Chapter 13 by considering extreme debtor types based on the experiments carried out in Figure 5.
The distribution of recovery rates related to “bad types” conditions on being a repeat filer, having
high arrears, and having low excess income relative to debt. This “worst case” scenario generates
an average recovery rate of only 16 percent, with a substantial 72 percent of debtors repaying
less than 20 percent of their debt and only 1 percent repaying more than 80 percent. At the
other extreme, the distribution of recovery rates for “good types” is conditional on being a first-
time filer, having low arrears, and having high excess income relative to debt. This distribution
is associated with a much higher 49 percent average recovery rate, with only 35 percent of the
debtors repaying between 0 percent and 20 percent of their debt and 31 percent of debtors repaying
at least 80 percent.
6.3 Importance of Shocks in Bankruptcy
We saw in Table 6 that the timing of the excess income shock ⌧ plays a notable role in
the trustee’s reevaluation of previously confirmed cases, as indicated by the significance of the
coe cient of ⌧ but the excess income shock ⌘ itself is statistically insignificant. However, as can be
seen from our structural model, it plays an important role in the plan length choice of the debtors
(see (1)). As such, it is not surprising that the statistical insignificance of the excess income shock,
⌘, does not rule out its economic importance on the observed bankruptcy outcomes.
To quantify their importance in explaining the observed data, we provide in Table 8 a com-
parison of Chapter 13 outcomes between our benchmark model and the model estimated without
latent variables ⌘ and ⌧ . In the absence of shocks after a plan confirmation, we find that debtors
are less willing to commit to long-term plans. Debtors with unfavorable characteristics tend to file
for longer plans to increase their chances of confirmation and decrease the probability of dismissal.
However, with the elimination of the dismissal process later in the plan, fewer debtors feel the
need to file for long plans. The confirmation rates conditional on plan length stay unchanged even
if the ratio of debtors who file for longer plans declines. The unconditional confirmation rate, on
the other hand, slightly declines due to more debtors filing for short-term plans. Furthermore,
without being a↵ected by changing circumstances while in bankruptcy, all debtors with confirmed
5b.
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plans are eventually discharged. We find that 81 percent of debtors in our sample are discharged
absent shocks as opposed to only 44 percent in the benchmark model. Furthermore, absent any
income shocks, debtors are able to repay on average 36 percent of their debt as opposed to 31
percent in the benchmark model. This finding arises, because without shocks, all plans are carried
out to completion. Therefore, aside from debtor characteristics that are observable at the time of
filing, changes in debtors’ conditions after the start of a bankruptcy procedure play a key role in
governing Chapter 13 outcomes.
6.4 Goodness of Fit
In order to gauge the fit of our model, we present figures that compare its predictions for the
distributions of endogenous variables with the analogous empirical distributions in the data. Each
figure focuses on a key aspect of Chapter 13 bankruptcy: the distribution of plan length chosen
by debtors, the confirmation rate, the discharge rate, and the distribution of recovery rates. We
assess how well our model fits the data using Pearson’s  2 test,
N
KX
j=1
h
f(j)  bf(j)i
f(j)
⇠  2K 1,
where f(.) denotes the empirical density function, or histogram, of a given endogenous variable
and bf(.) is the corresponding maximum likelihood estimate of the density function of that variable.
N is the number of observations, and K is the number of bins used in the histogram.
Figure 7, panel (a) shows a comparison of the distribution of plan length chosen by debtors
generated by the model (left columns) with the corresponding distribution in the data (right
columns). As indicated in the figure, the  2 goodness-of-fit test does not reject the model at
conventional significance levels. Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 7 illustrate similar comparisons with
respect to the confirmation rate and the discharge rate. In both cases, the model is capable of
reproducing the empirical distributions quite well, and the  2 goodness-of-fit tests cannot reject
the model at conventional significance levels. Finally, we can see from Figure 7, panel (d), that
the shape of the distribution of recovery rates produced by the model closely matches that of
the corresponding empirical distribution. The model slightly over-predicts the fraction of debtors
associated with relatively higher recovery rates, which implies a slightly higher average recovery
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rate than observed in the data. As in the other cases, however, the  2 goodness-of-fit test does
not reject the model at standard significance levels.
7 Policy Analysis
Recent changes in the bankruptcy law embodied in BAPCPA were primarily intended to
raise creditor recovery rates for subsets of debtors perceived to be benefiting from too lenient a
bankruptcy code. One such change now prohibits all debtors with income above the state median
from filing for short-term plans. Specifically, the law states that “the applicable commitment
period shall be (...) not less than five years, if the current monthly income of the debtor and
the debtor’s spouse combined, when multiplied by 12, is not less than (...) the median family
income of the applicable state.”34 Using the structural model we estimated, we now explore the
quantitative e↵ects of such a change on Chapter 13 outcomes.
7.1 Requiring Five-Year Plans for Above-Median-Income Debtors
Table 9 summarizes the e↵ects of requiring debtors with above-state-median-income to file for
five-year plans. Note that, following the policy change, debtors who had initially filed for three-
term plans, but who no longer have that option, may well decide not to file Chapter 13 altogether,
rather than filing for Chapter 13 and proposing a five-year plan. Put another way, and recalling
equation (1), debtors for whom V (L)   V (Z) when L = 3 in the benchmark model may well
have V (L) < V (Z) when L = 5 if forced to make the higher payments implied by a five-year
plan. Since V (Z) denotes the payo↵ obtained outside Chapter 13, these debtors would then exit
Chapter 13 bankruptcy. We find that this e↵ect is somewhat muted in this policy experiment, as
none of above-median-income debtors choose to exit Chapter 13 following the policy change.
Interestingly, for the set of debtors targeted by the policy change, the main finding is a minimal
increase in creditor recovery rates without considerably changing the discharge and confirmation
rates. In other words, requiring the above-median-income debtors to file for five-year plans makes
neither a financial fresh start more likely for that subset of debtors nor the creditors materially
better o↵. The standard deviation of the mean recovery rate under the new policy is 0.45 while
it is 0.43 under the baseline specification. These numbers imply a t-ratio of 1.05 under the null
34See 11 U.S.C § 1325(b)(4)(A)(ii).
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hypothesis that the two mean recovery rates are equal, which cannot be rejected at conventional
significance levels. We should also note that the outcomes in the overall sample are not materially
a↵ected from the policy change. This follows from the fact that debtors whose income exceeds
the state median represent only 23 percent of the filers in our sample.
In order to understand whether the policy is ine↵ective mainly due to the small sample size of
the debtors who are above the state median income, we consider two alternative policies. First,
we analyze the e↵ects of requiring debtors who are above the first decile of the state’s income
distribution to file for five-year plans. Next, we do the same for debtors who are above the first
quartile of the state’s income distribution. Table 10 illustrates that when the policy change targets
individuals who are closer to the left tail of the income distribution, it becomes more e↵ective.
The reason is twofold. First, 79 percent of the filers in our sample are above the first decile
of the income distribution for Delaware. For this reason, requiring this group of debtors to file
for five-year plans have a notable e↵ect on the outcomes of the overall sample. Second, because
having a lower monthly income lowers the probability of discharge, requiring the debtors with
lower incomes to file for five-year plans considerably raises the discharge rate for this group of
debtors and leads to a larger increase in the mean recovery rates compared to the case when the
policy targets above-median-income debtors.
An important consideration under this policy provision is that, while more debtors are be-
ing pushed into five-year plans, the analysis assumes that their other characteristics remain un-
changed. This simplifying assumption reflects a limitation of our data. As a direction for future
research, it would be ideal to sample the general population and, given this sample, consider both
bankruptcy and chapter choices explicitly.35
35For now, this more challenging exercise remains beyond the scope of this paper. While some existing data sets
such as the Survey of Consumer Finances, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and the National Longitudinal
Survey of Young Men provide us with financial and income statements pertaining to the general U.S. population,
the challenge lies in the collection of data on bankruptcy filers, and more precisely Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filers
separately, within that general population, as well as the resolution of their respective bankruptcy cases. For this
reason, the di↵erent policy experiments in this paper are conditional on the observed distribution of the debtor
characteristics.
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7.2 Imposing a Minimum Proposed Recovery Threshold
Because the BAPCPA policy change targeted at above-median-income debtors proved inef-
fective in raising their recovery rates, we explore an alternative policy experiment that instead
requires these debtors to propose at least a 30 percent recovery rate in order to have their plan con-
firmed by the court. In other words, we impose that all debtors with above-state-median-income
propose at least the observed mean recovery rate in our sample.
Table 11 suggests that, when confronted with this alternative policy change, a considerable
fraction of debtors (26 percent) now find it optimal not to file under Chapter 13 in the first place.
Accordingly, substantially fewer debtors ultimately obtain a financial fresh start under Chapter
13; the discharge rate falls, from 0.50 to 0.37, for this group of a↵ected filers.
The average creditor recovery rate under this policy experiment falls from 0.35 to 0.28, for the
a↵ected debtors. The latter result can be understood in the following way. First, above-state-
median-income debtors who were already proposing to repay at least 30 cents on the dollar see
their fate (confirmation, discharge, and repayment rates) essentially unchanged by the new policy.
Hence, any e↵ect of the policy change on bankruptcy outcomes must come from debtors who were
initially proposing less than a 30 percent recovery rate. Second, the fact that a sizable portion
of the debtors are option out of Chapter 13 under the new policy means that these debtors are
assigned zero recovery rates. Therefore, even though these debtors are precisely those associated
with low Chapter 13 recovery rates in the benchmark model, their decision to stay out of Chapter
13 has a considerable e↵ect on the overall recovery rates. In the end, the model suggests that
the hypothetical minimum recovery rate policy studied here makes it more di cult for debtors to
obtain a financial fresh start as well as decreasing the creditor recovery rates.
7.3 Implications for Overall Recovery Rates
Thus far, our policy experiments have tracked bankruptcy outcomes, and in particular creditor
recovery rates, within Chapter 13 bankruptcy only. In computing recovery rates, therefore, we did
not particularly focus on debtors who wound up outside Chapter 13 for one reason or another. For
some policy experiments, this is not necessarily a problem since the fraction of debtors who opt out
of Chapter 13 following a given policy change is negligible (or zero), as in the case of BAPCPA. In
other cases, however, as in the experiment that imposes a minimum proposed recovery threshold
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to obtain confirmation of a case, the fraction of debtors who chose not to file for Chapter 13
is sizable. In addition, recall that some debtors are also dismissed out of Chapter 13 at a later
bankruptcy stage. In such cases, debtors may be able to file under Chapter 7 or simply default on
their loans. Since our focus in this paper is on Chapter 13, we model the payo↵ outside Chapter
13 as an indirect utility.
A question remains as to how overall recovery rates are a↵ected by the recovery rates outside
Chapter 13. To be able to answer this question, we would need to model what happens outside
Chapter 13. Unfortunately, we do not have the data to be able to estimate such a richer model,
and to the best of our knowledge, such micro data is not available. At a more aggregated level,
Flynn, Bermant and Bakewell (2002) document that during the year ended June 30, 2002, in
approximately 96 percent of Chapter 7 filings, the case closed without any funds being collected
by the trustee and distributed to creditors. In general, studies report a 0 percent average return
to creditors from Chapter 7 filers. Indeed, this is what motivated BAPCPA to push debtors into
Chapter 13 in the first place.
Taking into account the possibility that the debtors in our data set can be in better financial
shape than those debtors considered in the above statistics, Table 12 presents overall recovery rate
calculations based on the assumption that debtors outside Chapter 13 repay either 10 percent or
20 percent of their debts. The table considers the experiment where above-state-median-income
debtors must propose at least a 30 percent recovery rate in order to have their case confirmed
by the court. Recall that in contrast to the BAPCPA experiment we considered, this policy
experiment was associated with a sizable fraction of debtors no longer choosing to file under
Chapter 13. The benchmark model in Table 12 refers to the situation without the policy change,
but is nevertheless relevant since, even in that case, some debtors are either dismissed by the
trustee or voluntarily exit Chapter 13 after initial confirmation. As expected, overall recovery
rates increase, both in the benchmark model and in the policy experiment, when debtors outside
Chapter 13 repay positive amounts on their debts. This increase, however, remains somewhat
contained, even at the extreme where debtors outside Chapter 13 repay 20 cents on the dollar.
More importantly, as in Table 11, the policy change is unable to yield an increase, and even yields
a decrease, relative to the higher recovery rates generated in the benchmark model. As before,
this result is driven by the fact that debtors with recovery rates below 30 cents on the dollar
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opting out of Chapter 13. Therefore, even when the outside recovery rate is assumed to be 20
percent, the creditors still lose on the debtors for whom the recovery rates are between 20 to 30
percent under the benchmark model, as these debtors opt out of Chapter 13 under the new policy.
8 Conclusion
From court dockets recorded in the state of Delaware between 2001 and 2002, we built and
estimated a structural model of Chapter 13 bankruptcy. We find that several factors significantly
a↵ect the distribution of creditor recovery rates: whether debtors are first-time filers, their arrears
at the time of filing, and their income in excess of that required for basic maintenance. The
analysis further underscores the importance of changes in debtors’ conditions while in bankruptcy
in governing Chapter 13 outcomes, including debtors’ ability to obtain a financial fresh start. Our
model predicts that the more stringent provisions of Chapter 13 in BAPCPA, in particular those
that force subsets of debtors to file for long-term plans, would not materially a↵ect creditor
recovery rates and would not make discharge materially more likely for that subset of debtors.
The results are also true in the context of alternative policy experiments that required bankruptcy
plans to meet stricter standards in order to be confirmed by the court.
The analysis has an important caveat. Because of data limitations, we do not model simul-
taneously households’ bankruptcy and chapter choice decisions. At this point, the payo↵ that
debtors achieve outside of Chapter 13 is captured by way of an estimated indirect utility. How-
ever, this modeling strategy precludes a more detailed study of policy reforms that directly target
chapter choice decisions, such as the new tougher provisions on lien stripping of auto loans. We
leave this work to future research.
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9 Tables
Table 1: Data Summary
Total Filings 821
Terminated 821
Discharged 364
Dismissed 457
Without a confirmed plan 155
After a plan confirmation 302
Converted to Chapter 7 52
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Standard Median Min Max
Deviation
Cases Without a Confirmed Plan
Plan Length (Months) 56.90 7.86 60 36 60
Assets ($) 127,168 113,004 105,250 295 1,239,220
Assets/debt in default 4.85 5.36 3.76 0.02 54.85
Arrears ($) 18,766 16,863 14,829 30.43 117,888
Arrears/debt in default 0.58 0.30 0.59 0.002 1
Unsecured debt ($) 19,265 42,289 14,737 0 642,642
Excess income ($) 4,908 3,597.4 3,876 660 23,987
Whole Sample
Plan length (Months) 55.60 8.78 60 32 60
Assets ($) 117,739 98,797 104,000 295 1,239,220
Assets/debt in default 4.42 4.79 3.28 0.02 55.46
Arrears ($) 15,492 12,517 11,000 30.43 132,012
Arrears/debt in default 0.48 0.29 0.46 0.001 1
Unsecured debt ($) 25,767 42,289 14,737 0 642,642
Excess income ($) 4,550 3,425.7 3,708 600 34,932
Medical debt (if exceeds 10% of total debt in default)⇤ 0.08 0.28 0 0 1
Job tenure (years) 4.91 7.61 1 0 40
Income above median⇤ 0.23 0.42 0 0 1
Repeat filer⇤ 0.24 0.42 0 0 1
Homeowner⇤ 0.89 0.31 1 0 1
Attorney experience⇤ (number of cases) 94.05 51.67 108 0 165
Monthly rent or mortgage payments ($) 845.75 431.25 760 2.5 4,299
Monthly rent or mortgage payment/monthly income 0.31 0.13 0.29 0.0009 1.06
Note: ⇤ indicates dummy variables; zero attorney experience indicates that the filer did not
hire an attorney.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Fraction of Three-Year Plans⇤ 0.16
Confirmation Rate 0.81
Discharge Rate 0.44
Recovery Rate for Total Debt in Default
Mean 0.29
Standard Deviation 0.34
Median 0.14
Proposed Recovery Rate for Total Debt in Default
Mean 0.66
Standard Deviation 0.4
Median 0.6
⇤Three-year plans are defined as plans less than or equal to 48 Months
Table 4: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
L The debtor’s choice of plan length: 3 or 5 years.
ratio asset debt Total assets as a fraction of debt in default at the time of filing.
ratio arrears debt Arrears accumulated on secured debt as a fraction of debt in default
at the time of filing.
ratio rent mortgage inc Monthly rent or mortgage payments as a fraction of monthly income.
medical debt Whether medical debts exceed 10% of total debt in default.
job tenure The debtor’s tenure in years in his current job.
(If the debtor is unemployed, this variable is equal to zero.)
inc above med Whether the debtor’s most recent annual income at the time of filing
is above the state median.
repeat filer Whether the debtor has previously filed for bankruptcy.
attorney exp Attorney experience in handling bankruptcy cases, measured as the
in-sample frequency.
eligible 7 Whether the debtor is eligible for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
p recovery rate The proposed recovery rate defined as total proposed payments over
total debt in default.
discharge recovery rate The recovery rate obtained upon discharge. It is calculated as total
payments over total debt in default, conditional on the trustee not
dismissing the debtor after the realization of shocks to excess income.
dismiss recovery rate The recovery rate obtained upon dismissal. It is calculated as the
ratio of total payments made by the debtor under the plan, prior to
the realization of the shocks to excess income, to total debt in default.
arrears Arrears accumulated on secured debt.
assets Total assets.
unsecured debt Total amount of unsecured debt.
homeowner Whether the debtor is a homeowner.
⌘ Excess income shock.
⌧ Timing of the excess income shock.
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Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Confirmation Probability
Q(C|L,Z)
Parameter Estimate Definition
 c0 -0.105 constant.
(0.481)
 c1 0.418
⇤⇤⇤ plan length.
(0.092)
 c2 -0.021 assets as a fraction of debt in default at the time of filing.
(0.014)
 c3 -0.778
⇤⇤⇤ arrears accumulated on secured debt.
(0.297)
 c4 -1.010
⇤ rent or mortgage payments as a fraction of monthly income.
(0.545)
 c5 -0.001 whether medical debt exceeds 10% of total debt in default.
(0.325)
 c6 0.026
⇤⇤⇤ job tenure.
(0.012)
 c7 0.310 whether the debtor’s annual income is above the state median.
(0.193)
 c8 -0.393
⇤⇤⇤ whether the debtor has previously filed for bankruptcy.
(0.176)
 c9 0.006
⇤⇤⇤ attorney experience in handling bankruptcy cases.
(0.001)
 c10 -0.081 proposed recovery rate.
(0.149)
 c11 0.010 whether the debtor is eligible for Chapter 7.
(0.204)
⇤ indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; ⇤⇤ indicates statistical significance at the 5%
level; and ⇤⇤⇤ indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table 6: Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Dismissal Probability
Pr(S = 1|L, ⌘, ⌧, Z)
Parameter Estimate Definition
 d0 -2.360
⇤⇤⇤ constant.
(0.570)
 d1 -0.151
⇤⇤ plan length.
(0.070)
 d2 0.062
⇤⇤⇤ assets as a fraction of debt in default at the time of filing.
(0.025)
 d3 2.594
⇤⇤⇤ arrears accumulated on secured debt.
(0.465)
 d4 3.545
⇤⇤⇤ rent or mortgage payments as a fraction of monthly income.
(1.055)
 d5 -0.018 whether medical debt exceeds 10% of total debt in default.
(66.952)
 d6 -0.024
⇤⇤ job tenure.
(0.012)
 d7 -0.476
⇤ whether the debtor’s annual income is above the state median.
(0.256)
 d8 1.354
⇤⇤⇤ whether the debtor has previously filed for bankruptcy.
(0.283)
 d9 0.005
⇤⇤ attorney experience in handling bankruptcy cases.
(0.002)
 d10 0.016 recovery rates to be obtained upon discharge.
(1.571)
 d11 0.007 whether the debtor is eligible for Chapter 7.
(0.282)
 d12 -0.024 recovery rates to be obtained upon dismissal.
(9.029)
 d13 -0.239 dollar amount of the shock to excess income.
(0.740)
 d14 -0.911
⇤⇤⇤ timing of the shock to excess income.
(0.280)
⇤ indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; ⇤⇤ indicates statistical significance at the5%
level; and ⇤⇤⇤ indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table 7: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Estimate Definition
Payo↵ from outside options
 D1 -5.212
⇤⇤ arrears accumulated on secured debt.
(2.320)
 D2 -0.517
⇤⇤⇤ assets.
(0.209)
 D3 -1.287
⇤⇤⇤ unsecured debt.
(0.354)
 D4 -16.698
⇤⇤⇤ whether the debtor is a homeowner.
(7.079)
f⌧ (⌧ |L)
 ⌧3 0.430
⇤⇤⇤ parameter of the distribution of ⌧ when proposed pay length is 3.
(0.032)
 ⌧5 0.299
⇤⇤⇤ parameter of the distribution of ⌧ when proposed pay length is 5.
(0.015)
f⌘(⌘|L)
↵⌘0 -463.044
⇤⇤⇤ constant.
(14.974)
↵⌘1 -7.024
⇤⇤⇤ plan length.
(1.317)
↵⌘2 -0.563 whether medical debt exceeds 10% of total debt in default.
(1562.443)
↵⌘3 -10.623 whether the debtor has previously filed for bankruptcy.
(490.365)
↵⌘4 9.985
⇤⇤⇤ job tenure.
(0.744)
 ⌘0 3219.786
⇤⇤⇤ constant.
(65.842)
 ⌘1 33.950
⇤⇤⇤ plan length.
(6.280)
 ⌘2 3.689 whether medical debt exceeds 10% of total debt in default.
(859.203)
 ⌘3 5.130 whether the debtor has previously filed for bankruptcy.
(240.309)
 ⌘4 -6.199
⇤⇤⇤ job tenure.
(1.393)
⇤ indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; ⇤⇤ indicates statistical significance at the 5%
level; and ⇤⇤⇤ indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table 8: Effects of Changes in Debtors’ Conditions
Model Model Without ⌘ and ⌧
Whole Sample
Fraction Not Filing 0.00 0.00
Plan Length
Fraction Proposing L = 3 0.20 0.34
Fraction Proposing L = 5 0.80 0.66
Confirmation Rate Conditional on L = 3 0.73 0.73
Confirmation Rate Conditional on L = 5 0.85 0.85
Unconditional Confirmation Rate 0.82 0.81
Discharge Rate 0.44 0.81
Mean Recovery Rate 0.31 0.46
Table 9: Implementing BAPCPA-Required 5-year Plans
Benchmark Experiment
Above-Median-Income Debtors
Fraction Not Filing 0.00 0.00
Plan Length
Fraction Proposing L = 3 0.19 0.00
Fraction Proposing L = 5 0.81 1.00
Confirmation Rate Conditional on L = 3 0.78 0.00
Confirmation Rate Conditional on L = 5 0.88 0.88
Unconditional Confirmation Rate 0.86 0.88
Discharge Rate 0.50 0.51
Mean Recovery Rate 0.35 0.37
Whole Sample
Confirmation Rate Conditional on L = 3 0.73 0.71
Confirmation Rate Conditional on L = 5 0.85 0.85
Unconditional Confirmation Rate 0.82 0.83
Discharge Rate 0.44 0.44
Mean Recovery Rate 0.31 0.31
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Table 10: Implementing Required 5-year Plans for Different Income Groups
Above 10th Percentile Above 25th Percentile
Benchmark Experiment Benchmark Experiment
Targeted Debtors
Fraction Not Filing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Plan Length
Fraction Proposing L = 3 0.20 0.00 0.19 0.00
Fraction Proposing L = 5 0.80 1.00 0.81 1.00
Confirmation Rate Conditional on L = 3 0.74 0.00 0.75 0.00
Confirmation Rate Conditional on L = 5 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86
Unconditional Confirmation Rate 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.86
Discharge Rate 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.49
Mean Recovery Rate 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.34
Whole Sample
Confirmation Rate Conditional on L = 3 0.73 0.71 0.73 0.71
Confirmation Rate Conditional on L = 5 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
Unconditional Confirmation Rate 0.82 0.85 0.82 0.84
Discharge Rate 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.45
Mean Recovery Rate 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.32
Table 11: Imposing a 30% Recovery Rate Threshold
Benchmark Model Experiment
Above-Median-Income Debtors
Fraction Not Filing 0.00 0.26
Plan Length
Fraction Proposing L = 3 0.19 0.10
Fraction Proposing L = 5 0.81 0.64
Confirmation Rate Conditional on L = 3 0.78 0.76
Confirmation Rate Conditional on L = 5 0.88 0.88
Unconditional Confirmation Rate 0.86 0.64
Discharge Rate 0.50 0.37
Mean Recovery Rate 0.35 0.28
Whole Sample
Confirmation Rate Conditional on L = 3 0.73 0.72
Confirmation Rate Conditional on L = 5 0.85 0.85
Unconditional Confirmation Rate 0.82 0.66
Discharge Rate 0.44 0.36
Mean Recovery Rate 0.31 0.25
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Table 12: Imposing a 30% Recovery Rate Threshold - Outside Recovery
Outside Recovery Rate: 0.10 Outside Recovery Rate: 0.20
Benchmark Experiment Benchmark Experiment
Above-Median-Income Debtors
Fraction Not Filing 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.26
Initial Dismissal Rate Conditional on
L = 3 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.24
L = 5 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Unconditional Initial Dismissal Rate 0.24 0.36 0.24 0.36
Dismissed after Confirmation 0.36 0.27 0.36 0.27
Mean Recovery Rate
Under Chapter 13 0.35 0.28 0.35 0.28
Overall 0.38 0.33 0.42 0.39
Whole Sample
Overall Mean Recovery Rate 0.34 0.30 0.39 0.36
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10 Figures
Figure 1: Distribution of Plan Length in Months
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Figure 2: Distributions of Proposed and Actual Credit Recovery Rates
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Figure 3: Conditional Distributions of Recovery Rates
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Figure 5: Model-Generated Conditional Distributions of Recovery Rates
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Figure 6: Distributions of Recovery Rates for Extreme Debtor Types
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Figure 7: Model Fit (left columns: model; right columns: data)
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